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Micro-economic effects of public funds on enterprises
in Hungary
Györgyi Nyikos a, Attila Béresb and Tamás Laposac
ABSTRACT
To enhance the effectiveness of and return on public investments, using financial instruments in addition to
grants has lately become an increasingly preferred policy instrument choice in Central and Eastern Europe.
The paper examines the impact different financial tools bring about at a micro-level. This enables
recommendations for policy-makers to be produced on the type of assistance that could be of best use to
improve access to finance for micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises, and thus achieve long-term,
sustainable economic growth. The analysis is based on counterfactual evaluation and difference-in-
differences. The findings indicate that the use of European Union funds (both grants and financial
instruments) has a beneficial influence on employment and sales. However, the results also illustrate that in
order to achieve the goal of higher impact and certain productivity effects, subsidies should be allocated to
the initially less productive small firms in the less developed regions. Another important outcome is that, to
some extent, financing through financial instruments has more direct relevance to advanced productivity, and
due to their revolving nature, they generate more positive impact on the Hungarian economy than do grants.
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INTRODUCTION
Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) play a major role in economic develop-
ment. Entrepreneurship has been broadly recognized as a means of job creation, innovation and
economic growth (e.g., Audretsch & Keilbach, 2004; Jurado & Battisti, 2019; Wong et al.,
2005). Therefore, the availability of external finance for MSMEs occupies a high position on
the agenda of policy-makers. Namely, the lack of it is seen as a barrier to business growth.
MSMEs suffer from the existence of a structural lending gap, that is, some MSMEs are unable
to raise bank financing at a reasonable interest rate, which negatively influences their economic
performance (Beck et al., 2008; Kraemer-Eis et al., 2015).
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Besides private, also public sources and European Union (EU) funds (in the form of grants1 of
financial instruments – FIs2) are available to finance economic development tools. Reviews of the
effects of EU funds (Pienkowski & Berkowitz, 2015) offer both a good oversight and a meta-analy-
sis of the existing literature assessing EU Cohesion Policy. These studies have generally ‘found
positive, although usually small impact of EU funds on regional growth, especially in less developed
regions’ (Pienkowski & Berkowitz, 2015, p. 9). Other studies present no statistically significant
impact of EU Cohesion Policy (Dall’erba & LeGallo, 2008); neither do they reveal an impact con-
ditional on the local context, depending on the country (Béres et al., 2019; Le Gallo et al., 2011) or
the quality of institutions (Ederveen et al., 2006; Nyikos & Talaga, 2015). Many researchers have
identified no impact or recognized highly disputable effects of MSME support from EU or
national government policies (Edwards et al., 2007; Nightingale & Coad, 2014; Norrman &
Bager-Sjögren, 2010; Tödtling-Schönhofer et al., 2011), whereas others articulated that the influ-
ence of rural development measures is rather close to zero or non-significant (Bakucs et al., 2018).
As a summary, researches have acknowledged that the impact of Cohesion Policy is far from uni-
form; academic interest has shifted away from attempts to assess its ‘total impact’ towards an
emphasis on the ‘conditioning factors’ that explain where, when and how policy is proven effective
(Crowley, 2017; Fratesi & Wishlade, 2017; Morisson & Doussineau, 2019).
The long-standing pressures to deliver better results with the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds
have been intensified in the current context of an economic austerity. EU Cohesion Policy is pre-
sently expected to achieve more tangible outcomes with fewer resources. This requires a stronger
focus on the return on investment and sustainability of interventions, better strategic management
as well as the employment of integrated and place-based approach (Dąbrowski, 2015; Hajdu et al.,
2017). This transition has been matched by academic research showing cases of better performance
for FIs than grants for firm support initiatives (e.g., Bondonio & Martini, 2012). FIs aim to
increase the overall capital available by unlocking other public sector funding and private sector
resources through co-financing and co-investment (Nyikos, 2016; Wishlade et al., 2019). The lit-
erature has also examined access to finance support measures such as grants and awards, loans with
reduced interest rates, credit guarantees and support for research and development (R&D) (Dvoul-
ety et al., 2019). It is important to note that the EU support schemes differ greatly in the various
member states (Nyikos, 2013), consequentially different results may occur forMSMEdevelopment
measures depending on the type of programme and its implementation context (Potluka et al.,
2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of interventions may also be contingent on the institutional
environment (Bachtler et al., 2014; Charron & Lapuente, 2013; Ferry & Polverari, 2018; Rodrí-
guez-Pose &Garcilazo, 2015; Smeriglio et al., 2016). A clear lesson from evaluations and studies is
that FIs must be tailored to local needs and conditions (Michie &Wishlade, 2011; Musiałkowska
& Idczak, 2018; Nyikos, 2017).
Streamlining public financial tools for the future programming period is still complicated as
the literature on the effects of EU FIs at the micro-level is quite limited in Hungary (e.g., Banai
et al., 2017a, 2017b; Béres, 2016; Béres & Závecz, 2016). In this research, when studying the
impact of economic development policy, we looked beyond gross domestic product (GDP)
and macroeconomic figures to examine the economic effects of the different sources at the
micro-level. This paper is limited to a narrow set of sources, which have been financing
MSMEs and economic development, and their impact on economic indicators.
THE HUNGARIAN CASE: BASELINE AND THE RESULTS OF
MACROECONOMIC ANALYSES
Baseline situation: EU funds in Hungary
Since Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, the country has used significant EU funds3 to
finance development programmes. Within the framework of the seven-year EU budget, one-
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fifth of the annual Hungarian GDP was injected into the economy in the form of EU subsidies.
Since 2010, sources have averaged around 5% of national income annually, which is by far the
highest in the region. In fact, Hungary has benefitted from the second highest allocation of
funds per capita (Nyikos & Soós, 2020). The Hungarian economy was able to show significant
GDP growth of 4.6% in the period 2006–15; nevertheless, it lagged behind the region’s growth
leaders. Growth was driven by public investment, while private investment began to decline. In
the programming period 2007–13 about €4 billion was allocated to enterprise support and inno-
vation, equivalent to just over 18% of the total funding available. In the current programming
period, Hungary has made extensive use of FIs providing support in the form of loans or venture
capital (mainly under the JEREMIE programme) co-financed by the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF). The funding to FIs for enterprises amounts to €897 million (€762
million of which comes from the ERDF). Hence, in the absence of a developed capital market,
EU funding represents one of the key funding instruments of the Hungarian MSME sector –
besides bank loans and guarantees (Banai et al., 2017a).
Macroeconomic evaluation of the effect of Cohesion Funds in Hungary
The European Commission has published numerous studies to assess the impacts of EU funds,
examining the effects of various schemes and periods employing a DSGE (dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium modeling) model (e.g., Monfort et al., 2016; Roager et al., 2008; Varga &
in’t Veld, 2011). The model primarily looks at their impact on GDP: the findings broadly
confirm the positive impact of subsidies (e.g., Monfort et al., 2016; Varga & in’t Veld, 2011).
Macroeconomic analyses call the additional demand produced in the economy during the year
of grant project implementation as the demand effect, and the lasting effect of an increase in pro-
duction efficiency as a supply effect. However, these effects are not limited to the project bene-
ficiaries, but they form a chain on both the supply and demand sides. The short-term, demand-
side effects of development policy in a given year are greater than the long-term effects. None-
theless, towards the end of the programming period, cumulative supply effects from previous
years’ support may even reach the level of demand. Supply effects do not influence the sustained
growth rate of the economy, but increase the level of GDP. In the absence of subsidies, the one-
off effects of demand could even slow the economic growth rate for up to a year, as Hungary’s
experience reflected it in 2016.
EU funds are geared towards reinforcing social, economic and territorial cohesion in the long
term and not in pure economic terms; also, several macroeconomic models attempt to measure an
impact that was not an objective in the programmes. For many of the above-listed questions,
which are linked to the economic effects, currently available methodologies do not offer a proper
response. Therefore, measuring the financial and economic impact of Cohesion Policy can only
be based on estimations. Adequately valuing the results of different schemes in a complex mod-
elling framework creates many difficulties, too. Figure 1 shows the financial operations and the
effects of economic development projects.
The studies and evaluations, which have examined the macroeconomic effects of EU funds on
the Hungarian economy, illustrate different findings.
One perspective emphasizes that the growth of the Hungarian economy would have been sig-
nificantly lower, instead of 4.5% only 1.8% without the EU subsidies (KPMG, 2017). Based on
Quest III (a New Keynesian, dynamic equilibrium model), the European Commission estimates
in 2016 suggested that by 2015 Hungary’s GDP level had raised by 5.3% due to the implemen-
tation of the EU funds.
Another conclusion is that the increase in the expansion of the Hungarian economy would
not have been significantly lower without the EU funds, considering their inefficiency. This
opinion is mirrored in the impact evaluations of the Hungarian programmes prepared by the
HÉTFA Research Institute (HÉTFA, 2015) using a macro-level approach: the HÉTFA-
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CGE model applied a multisectoral macroeconomic impact assessment model framework based
on the calculated general equilibriummethodology, in line with the Hungarian Central Statistical
Office Sectoral Relationship Matrix. The essence of the model is that it ‘spreads’ the effects of
development sources to the economy through inter-sectoral productive relationships, thus inte-
grating both spillover demand effects and rival crowding-out effects from intra- and inter-sector
imbalances. According to the findings, although developments provided a short-run direct
impulse to the Hungarian economy, they did not produce any long-term increase in capacity,
or improvement in efficiency. At the end of the period, the level of GDP was nearly 2% higher
than it would have been without subsidies. The assertion is that over a period of six years (2009–
14), Hungary managed to squeeze out a 2% GDP growth surplus from 20% to 25% of annual
GDP. That means an average of 0.3% a year.
Another illustrative approach (Oblath, 2016) is that the value of EU transfers is reflected in
GDP. In this case, two contradictory effects are eliminated: (1) a part of the EU money will not
be a domestic performance but an import; and (2) the multiplier effect of the money spending
will increase the economic impact of transfers.
In another evaluation (Dedák, 2015), the net EU transfers work in macroeconomic terms in
the same way as the fiscal stimulus, but without a budget deficit: there is demand-generating gov-
ernment expenditure, however, without income deduction appearing in the form of taxes. By fil-
tering out EU funding, this method presents the smallest rate of GDP growth. Figure 2 shows
the trend of Hungary’ GDP between 2010 and 2015, together with the findings of the above-
mentioned models.
The assessment of the budgetary impact constitutes another approach; however, it could vary
depending on the following:
. How much the government would have invested in the absence of EU funds (almost
impossible to estimate).
. How the various transfers between the national budget and the EU budget or between pro-
gramming periods have evolved.
Figure 1. Financial operations and effects of economic development projects.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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. The size of the operational programmes, their co-financing rate and the proportion of own
contribution required from project promoters.
. The size of the tax implications that generate additional revenue for the national budget.
. How the exchange rate changed during the programming period (as the EU funds are
defined in euros and disbursed in Hungarian forints (HUF) in Hungary).
. The basis for co-financing (public cost versus total cost).
. The location of purchases by beneficiaries during the project implementation (inland or
abroad).
Based on the simplest logic, the financial effects could be calculated as follows. For the period
2007–13, the EU transfers – without transfers of the previous period – amounted to €15.135 bil-
lion (HUF4276 billion converted at yearly exchange rates). In the same period, a payment of
HUF5778 billion for the projects was accounted for, resulting in a net budgetary impact of
HUF1180 billion (additional tax revenues minus the national co-financing obligation):
5778/4276 = 1.35 . It means that the national co-financing and the beneficiary’s own resources,
respectively, added approximately 35% to the value of the investment compared with the value of
the EU grants alone. As regards the budgetary impact, 1180/5778 = 0.2, equality means that an
investment of HUF100 from Cohesion Policy funds results in an average budget revenue of
approximately HUF20. Meanwhile, in the period 2004–17, Hungary transferred HUF3217 bil-
lion as a member state contribution to the EU budget.
However, in this logic, economic development generates the lowest tax effect; due to the high
value added tax (VAT) rate in Hungary (27%), non-VAT-claiming organizations in the public
sector carry most of the tax effect. Meanwhile for-profit organizations reclaim their VAT
expenses from the budget and thus have a minimum or marginal fiscal effect. From a short-
term budgetary point of view, public investments generate significant revenue due to the signifi-
cant VAT implications of the investment and the personal income tax (PIT) implications for
European Social Fund (ESF)-type developments.
Figure 2. Gross domestic product (GDP) trend and paths according to different models.
Source: Internet journal Portfolió (12 October 2016) https://www.portfolio.hu/.
350 Györgyi Nyikos et al.
REGIONAL STUDIES, REGIONAL SCIENCE
Consequently, while public sector support for the private sector is considered to generate cer-
tain long-term development, support for public sector investment immediately returns in the
form of a tax, worth almost one third of the investment. This aspect inspires to undertake a
micro-level analysis as well to explore whether this long-term economic impact of MSME sup-
port really exists.
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT
FINANCES AT THE MICRO-LEVEL
Database
The database used is a panel with firm-years constituting the units of analysis. It consists of 2.8
million rows covering all taxpaying Hungarian firms with double-entry bookkeeping (including
530,000 companies with at least one year of operation) between 2008 and 2016 (nine years or
fewer for each company).
The variables contain firm-level characteristics, yearly aggregated information on EU subsi-
dies: grants and FIs received by the firms. The examined calls for proposals for the 2007–13 (with
N + 2 until 2015) programming period can be classified into four categories according to the
objectives and nature of funding: categories I and II comprise calls offering grants, while cat-
egories III and IV focus on FIs. Table 1 summarizes the objectives and the supported activities
of the calls.
The above calls provided funds for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) primarily.
Table 2 presents the funding opportunities for further target groups.
Data sources included the EMIR (Unified Monitoring Information System; grants), MFB
(Hungarian Development Bank; FIs) and NAV (National Tax and Customs Administration;
balance sheets for firms).
For the analysis, we used a subpopulation after filtering for companies with an average yearly
employment size between 1 and 249, with an average yearly sales volume > 0 and < HUF15.5
billion and with an average yearly balance sheet size > 0 and < HUF13.3 billion. In addition,
we excluded outliers in employment growth and sales growth within the subsidized firms by
deleting the observations of < 1st and > 99th percentiles in these two growth variables.
The number of projects analysed was 5687; these projects belonged to 5118 beneficiaries
(some beneficiaries had more than one subsidized project).
METHODS
The analyses were undertaken by using propensity score matching. In the first step, we coded the
treatment variable to have a value of 1 if a company:
. received grants from EU funds (from the Economic Development Operational Programme
(EDOP) or from the Regional Development Operational Programmes (RDOP));
. received funding from FIs under EDOP 4.1 or under the Central Hungary Operational
Programme (CHOP) 1.3.1. in the 2007–13 programming period.
We concentrated on those beneficiary companies that received only one type of subsidy
(either a grant or an FI) in one year during our four years’ impact period (t). We defined the
impact period between t – 1 and t + 2, (where t stands for the year of the signature of the support
contract) and we measured the impact as the change of the variables in focus (employment,
income and productivity) between t – 1 and t + 2. We did not take into account of firms receiving
more than one subsidy in the impact period, except if it received the same type of subsidy in year t,
because it would have unnecessarily complicated the analyses, blurred our identification without a
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marked gain in sample size. Finally, we worked with 5118 companies as treated (subsidized) in
the final filtered dataset (2% of the total filtered firm population).
In the second step, we selected controls for our treated companies.We limited our selection to
those firms that never received any of the EU subsidies that our treatments did in the treatment
period. The total number of potential control firms equalled 622,000 firms. It is worth mention-
ing that despite there being major differences between the potential control and the treated
groups, with the propensity score matching (described below), we selected – from the potential
controls – similar firms to the treated ones.
Out of these potential controls, we chose those that were similar to our variables of interest:
employment, sales, balance sheet size; employment growth, sales growth, and balance sheet size
growth (from t – 2 to t – 1); region (capital region versus the less developed regions) and sector
(manufacturing versus other). The matching was performed on the t – 1 year data (Table 3), and
we performed a one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching.
In Table 4, the columns show the means in certain variables for the matched control and the
treated groups. The last column represents the mean difference between the treated and matched
controls. Two-sample t-tests (Welch’s t-test assuming unequal variance) were used for hypoth-
esis testing (whether the means of the two groups are equal). For treated and matched control
Table 1. Overview of the examined calls (supported activities).
Categories Objectives Supported activities
I Employment and business
infrastructure development
Development of industrial parks
Incubation houses
Brownfield investments
Business site development
Service development
Technological development Improvement of applied technologies
Improvement of productivity
Application of new information technology (IT)
solutions
II Business efficiency Consulting
Business process development
Research, development and
innovation (R&D&I)
Research infrastructure development
Cooperation of business partners
Product, service and technology development
Launching of new products, services and
technologies
Clusters Cooperation of education, research institutes and
businesses
Improvement of business
environment
Development of logistics centres
Development of IT support centres
Knowledge-intensive supplier sector development
Improvement of market position of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
III Loan programme – tangible assets Extension of business activities
IT development, procurement of software and
hardware
Investment in tangible assets
IV Loan programme – current assets Extension of business activities
Finance of current assets
Source: Authors’ compilation of data from www.palyazat.gov.hu.
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groups the means represent the year of matching (one year before the subsidy was given for the
treated); accordinglyN shows the number of firms. The size of the control group is lower than the
total number of the treated firms because some treated firms are pairs for the same controls. The
results show that matched control and treated groups are statistically not different in many of the
matching variables; however, some differences remained (sales and balance sheet growth from t –
2 to t – 1, region and sector). To eliminate these, we performed the difference in differences
regression.
Finally, in the third step we applied a difference-in-difference regression. We implemented it
by performing a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (with robust standard errors) with
Table 2. Overview of the examined calls (target groups).
Categories Supported activities Target groups
I Development of industrial parks, brownfield
investments
Local governments, SMEs, cooperatives
Incubation houses Local governments, SMEs, non-profit
organizations, cooperatives universities,
research institutions
Business site development, service
development
SMEs, cooperatives
Improvement of applied technologies;
Improvement of productivity; application of
new information technology (IT) solutions
SMEs, cooperatives
II Consulting; business process development Micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises
(MSMEs), cooperatives, chambers
Research infrastructure development;
cooperation of business partners; product,
service and technology development;
launching of new products, services and
technologies
SMEs, non-profit organizations
Cooperation of education, research institutes
and businesses
SMEs, non-profit organizations,
cooperatives universities, research
institutions
Development of logistics centres;
development of IT support centres;
knowledge-intensive supplier sector
development; improvement of market
position of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs)
SMEs, cooperatives
III Extension of business activities; IT
development, procurement of software and
hardware; Investment in tangible assets
Micro-enterprises, SMEs
IV Extension of business activities; Finance of
current assets
Micro-enterprises, SMEs
Source: Authors’ compilation of data from www.palyazat.gov.hu.
Table 3. Comparison of baseline characteristics between control and treated groups (HUF million).
Projects Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Contracted value (€a) 5687 1500 4,067,000 91,800 219,700
Note: aWe calculated the amounts in euros by using an exchange rate of €280/HUF and rounded to two
digits (based on the 2010 end year rates).
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the variables of interest as the dependent variables (log employment, sales and productivity), with
categorical control variables (region, sector), time dummies (0 – year before the subsidy, 1 – two
years after the subsidy), treatment dummies (0 – control, 1 – treated) and the interaction of the
two as the independent variables. The latter is reported in our analyses as it captures the effect in
time due to the treatment (in this case, subsidy) by controlling for both the permanent differences
between the control and the treated and the time trends within the treated.
Generally, the above method is used to capture the effect of the treatment by comparing
the changes in the variables of interest over time (in this case between one year before and
two years after the subsidy) between a group that is treated (subsidized firms) and a group
that is not (control firms).4 Thus, by using repeated observations of the same firms, this
method controls for their unobservable time-invariant characteristics and those that affect
all firms similar. Besides, our propensity score matching guarantees that the treated and
not treated groups are similar in many observable characteristics (such as some firm-level
control variables and also in the dependent variables) before the treatment. Thus, we can
assume that the changes we see over time are due to the treatment received. We did sep-
arate difference-in-difference estimations for employment, sales and productivity (sales
divided by employment). In our analyses, we used the logarithms of these three variables.
Thus, in the empirical sections we present percentage changes (by what percentage a treat-
ment changes employment, sales or productivity).
Subgroup comparisons
As we mentioned above, the recent literature on EU FIs in Hungary is quite limited. Besides,
some methodological choices in our analysis differ from those presented in the published papers
(without further details: selection of dependent variables, transforming the dependent variables,
the criteria used for the selection of control firms, dealing with multiple treatments, combination
and exclusion of subsidies). This is because we wished to offer a substantial contribution. For this
purpose, besides the general analysis, we undertook some additional calculations by dividing our
sample along different characteristics:
. We analysed the difference in performance between the treated and the control firms. As a
reminder, the control firms were those that never received any of the EU subsidies the
treatments did.
. We divided our treatment group by differentiating the subsidy types.5 The firms may have
received FIs from the EDOP and/or RDOP-s; and/or a grant from the EDOP 4.1 and/or
Table 4. Comparison of baseline characteristics between control and treated groups (HUF million).
Control
(N=5014)
Treated
(N=5118)
Difference
(t-value)
Sales in t – 1 440 470 30 (1.22)
Balance sheet size in t – 1 320 330 10 (0.58)
Sales growth between t – 2 and t – 1 15 30 15** (2.72)
Balance sheet growth between t – 2 and t – 1 21 30 7* (2.35)
Employment in t – 1 18.6 18.8 0.2 (0.621)
Employment growth between t – 2 and t – 1 0.2 0.4 0.2 (0.137)
Manufacturing (%) 27.1% 23.6% −2.5*** (−4.40)
Based in the more developed Central
Hungarian Region (%)
36.8% 34.9% −1.9* (−2.17)
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
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CHOP 1.3.1. Based on these, we produced the following groups (total number: 5118):
firms that received (1) grants (N = 1498); and (2) FI (N = 590).
. We analysed the impacts on the firms with different sizes: micro (1–9 employees, N =
2917), small (10–50 employees, N = 1956) and medium (51–250 employees, N = 245).
. We differentiated the firms by sectors: manufacturing (N = 1158) and other (N = 3960) and
calculated the impacts on the two subgroups.
. The firms located in the more developed Central Hungarian Region (capital region) and
firms in the other Hungarian regions (less developed) were separated, and the impacts
on those were calculated.
. We divided all the firms (both controls and the treated ones) along their pre-subsidy pro-
ductivity (sales per employee). We separated the firms being above or below the median in
sales divided by the number of employees.
We matched the subsidized (treated) and non-subsidized (control) firms within each
subgroup.
RESULTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The general results illustrate that receiving a subsidy increased both the employment level and the
sales of the firms by 23.8% and 26.0%, respectively. However, in general, there is no significant
effect on productivity (Figure 3). These results illustrate complete accordance with the findings of
Banai et al. (2017a, 2017b). Despite the similarity of the results, they cannot, however, be fully
Figure 3. General effects of the subsidies.
Note: The horizontal axis shows the coefficients of the relationship between the interaction term (of
time and treatment) and the three dependent variables. Points show the coefficients, while lines show
the 95% confidence intervals. If confidence intervals do not cross the vertical line at zero, the relation-
ship is statistically significant. The values (× 100) mean percentages: by what percentage the subsidy
increases employment, sales or productivity. The three dependent variables are below each other along
the vertical axis represented by different symbols: circle (employment), triangle (sales) and diamond
(productivity).
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compared because of certain differing methodological decisions. As discussed above, in the pre-
sent paper we aim to understand better the effects of subsidies by dividing the sample into sub-
groups. This is accomplished in the following sections.
Dividing the treated firms into two groups yields the following results: when subsidized firms
received grants, the effects evidenced somewhat higher for employment and sales, but no signifi-
cant effect was revealed for productivity (Table 5). Having compared the results with the groups
that received FI, the results show that FIs produce similar significant, positive effects on
Table 5. Comparison between different types of subsidies (grants and financial instruments).
Type of subsidy
Grant Financial instrument
ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL
ATT 0.266*** 0.215*** −0.051 0.201*** 0.201* 0.001
R2 0.085 0.133 0.149 0.074 0.089 0.124
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
Table 6. Comparison between the effects of subsidies on different firm size.
Micro Small Medium
ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL
ATT 0.310*** 0.236*** −0.074 0.160*** 0.172*** 0.012 0.103 0.135 0.032
R2 0.063 0.136 0.137 0.044 0.148 0.208 0.061 0.196 0.251
Notes: Size of firm in term of number of employees: 1–9 = micro and 10–50 = small, 51–250 = medium.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
Table 7. Comparison between the effects of subsidies for manufacturing and other firms.
Manufacturing
No Yes
ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL
ATT 0.238*** 0.210*** −0.028 0.241*** 0.199* −0.042
R2 0.014 0.029 0.020 0.056 0.068 0.042
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
Table 8. Comparison between the effects of subsidies in the different regions.
More developed (Central Hungarian Region)
No Yes
ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL
ATT 0.232*** 0.207*** −0.025 0.248*** 0.202** −0.047
R2 0.117 0.142 0.161 0.049 0.100 0.127
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
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employment and sales as grants. Nonetheless, due to their revolving nature, they represent a
higher level of efficiency (FIs can be used for consecutive measures for different firms).
Measuring the impacts of subsidies on different firm sizes shows that the smaller the firm,
the larger the impact (Table 6). For medium-sized firms, we could find no significant effects
even for employment and sales (but for productivity, we could not find significant effects in
any of the size categories). These results are intuitive since they express the fact that subsidies
play a more significant role for firms that cannot obtain external financing from the market.
Our policy recommendation is that smaller firms should be more in the focus of the SME
development policies.
Examining the impact of subsidies on firms: whether or not they are manufacturing; or where
they are located: in the less developed regions or in the well-developed capital region we have met
significant positive findings for employment and sales (Tables 7 and 8).
When comparing less productive and more productive firms (see the definition in the sub-
group comparison section) we again achieved significant findings (Table 9).
The results confirm that the effect of subsidies is higher for weaker companies (initially less
productive) and generate less additional value for well-functioning (initially more productive)
ones, particularly in terms of impacts on productivity.
CONCLUSIONS
Economic actors can raise finance for their development projects from different kinds of sources:
public and/or private, refundable and/or non-refundable. Economic development and support
for MSMEs bear vital strategic importance. The corresponding finance, which has been made
available, is wide-ranging, from direct financial flows to credit guarantees or indirect funding.
Commercial banks provide finance for the European MSMEs. Nevertheless, despite a notable
increase in the availability of bank financing over the past years in Hungary, a financing gap
still exists (Banai et al., 2017; Kondor & Nyikos, 2019; Nyikos, 2013, 2017). This implies
that EU and public funds still satisfy a crucial function in financing economic development.
Moreover, an efficiently functioning institutional system and financial sector play a decisive
role both in fulfilling the financing requirements arising from the convergence process and the
adequate allocation and implementation of the available funds.
Since EU accession, Hungary has received significant amounts of EU funds; one-fifth of the
annual Hungarian GDP has been injected into the economy in the form of EU subsidies. The
sources have averaged about 5% of national income annually, this has been accompanied by sig-
nificant GDP growth. However, macroeconomic evaluations that have been published so far evi-
dence varied results on how the EU funds have affected Hungarian GDP.
Both the EU and member states contribute markedly to establishing adequate conditions for
MSMEs to access finance. However, the quality of private investments is primarily determined
by corporate decisions. The medium- to long-term effect of investments encompasses the
Table 9. Comparison between the effects of subsidies for more and less productive firms.
Productivity
Less productive More productive
ln L ln Q ln QL ln L ln Q ln QL
ATT 0.206*** 0.275*** 0.034* 0.215*** 0.197*** −0.018
R2 0.117 0.118 0.065 0.085 0.079 0.098
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Source: Authors.
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influence they exert on the companies’ competitiveness, the opening up of new job opportunities
and eventually contributing to local wealth creation.
Besides private sources companies use both grants and FIs to finance their projects in
Hungary. To evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of public financial tools we used a counter-
factual approach that enabled us to juxtapose comparable groups of supported and unsupported;
grant- or FIs-aided companies. Based on the results, our conclusion is the following:
. Subsidies have generally brought about positive effects on employment and sales, nonethe-
less they have not contributed significantly to productivity.
. There are higher employment effects in the case of smaller and more productive firms; how-
ever, in the case of smaller and less productive firms importance rests with triggering higher
sales.
. Comparison of grants and FIs illustrates that their effect on employment and sales is almost
the same; however, as FIs have a revolving nature they generate more positive economic
impact.
. Even though in both well- and less-developed regions there exists a positive impact on
employment and sales, it is higher in the less developed regions.
. The productivity effect is varied: subsidies have more significant effects on the initially less pro-
ductive firms, particularly in terms of productivity growth.
Investments and development projects form critical factors to economic development. Our
results show that the use of subsidies (grants or FIs as well) has a positive impact on employment
and sales; they do not really offer evidence for bettering productivity though. It is very important
to note that even though FIs are considered to finance more efficient projects, in Hungary their
added value essentially derives from their continued replenishment. Considering the very impor-
tant factor that FIs are offering a continuing cycle of funding, the conclusion is that they have
more positive impact on the economy than grants.
However, considering that through their projects non-VAT claiming organizations in the
public sector create most of the tax effects, from a short-term budgetary point of view public
investments generate significant revenue. If these projects prove a medium-to long-term positive
economic effect and the use of these additional sources achieves a more positive impact on the
economy than allocating EU finance to these public projects rather than to MSMEs appears
to be a reasonable policy choice.
Cohesion Policy is expected to serve a diversified set of objectives (that include economic
growth, competitiveness, employment, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, innovation,
etc.). Based on the results of our research, the reason suggests giving preference in grant or FI
funding to viable projects of companies that are not financed by commercial banks. However,
current inadequate solutions instigate the need to introduce new policy tools and instruments
for supporting, developing and improving the productivity of the Hungarian companies. There-
fore, a tentative normative conclusion would be that we need a clearer evaluation of the perform-
ance of FIs as well as thorough monitoring of all the relevant implementation elements necessary
for more effective and efficient use of EU funds.
NOTES
1 Grants can be defined as non-refundable subsidies.
2 Financial instruments are refundable subsidies defined in Financial Regulation as measures of
‘financial support provided from the budget in order to address one or more specific policy objec-
tives by way of loans, guarantees, equity or quasi-equity investments or participations, or other
risk-bearing instruments, possibly combined with grants’.
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3 In the 2000–06 programming period, €2.8 billion; in the period 2007–13, €25.3 billion; and
in the period 2014–20, €25.0 billion.
4 See https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/difference-
difference-estimation.
5 Differently, but this is also done in most of the cited Hungarian papers.
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